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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78A-4-103(2)G) and a Pourover Order entered by the Utah Supreme Court on May 19,
2017. The trial court entered its Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on April 18,
2017, attached as Addendum A. Appellant John Fenley ("Mr. Fenley") filed his Notice
of Appeal on May 16, 2017. By letter dated June 12, 2017, the Court set a deadline of
July 25, 2017 for the filing of the Appellant's Brief, which was subsequently extended by
stipulation to August 24, 2017.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred when it dismissed Mr. Fenley's
Complaint for failure to state a claim for relief, on the grounds that an individual

•

may not acquire property by eminent domain as a matter of law.
Standard of Review: Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, without
deference to the decision of the trial court. In re Adoption ofBaby B., 2012 UT 3 5, ,I 41,
308 P. 3d 382 ("No deference is given to the lower court's analysis of abstract legal
questions. This is because the lower court has no comparative advantage in resolving
legal questions and settled appellate precedent is of crucial importance in establishing a
clear, uniform body of law. Our review of conclusions of law is accordingly de novo.
We take a fresh look at questions of law decided by a lower court, according no
deference to its resolution of such issues.").
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•
Preservation: This issue is preserved through the arguments presented by Mr.
Fenley in his Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, filed April 10, 2017. (R.0092-0160, and
especially R.0095.)
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS

Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-6-505(3), attached as Addendum B.
"A person, other than a political subdivision of the state, that seeks to acquire
property by eminent domain or that intends to use eminent domain to acquire property if
the property cannot be acquired in a voluntary transaction shall ... [and then listing
preconditions to filing suit.]"

Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-6-507(1)(a), attached as Addendum C.
"The complaint shall contain: (a) the name of the corporation, association,
commission or person in charge of the public use for which the property is sought, who
must be styled plaintiff[.]"

Nash v. Clark, 75 P. 371 (Utah 1904), affirmed on appeal in Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S.

361 (1905) (affirming a judgment in favor of an individual who used the power of
eminent domain to condemn a portion of his neighbors' property), attached as Addendum
D.

6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
Mr. Fenley filed the Complaint in this action on March 7, 2017, seeking to obtain

through the power of eminent domain ownership and possession of certain real property
along with any structures thereon (the "Property"). R. 0001-0002. Mr. Fenley also
requested prejudgment relief in the form of an order permitting immediate occupancy, a
temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injunction to prevent Appellant Provo City
("Provo City") from destroying the building on the Property or from otherwise
transferring ownership of the Property during the pendency of the proceedings. See R.
0008 (Motion for Temporary Restraining Order); R. 0009 (Motion for Preliminary
Injunction and Request for Hearing); R. 0010 (Motion for Immediate Occupancy); R.

•

0010-0026 (Affidavit in Support of Immediate Occupancy Order); R. 0027 (Affidavit for
Temporary Restraining Order). The trial court denied the request for a temporary
restraining order on March 27, 2017. R. 0053. 1
Thereafter, Provo City filed a Motion to Dismiss on April 3, 2017 (the "Motion to
Dismiss"), arguing that the Complaint failed to state a claim for relief under Rule
12(b)(6) both because Mr. Fenley advanced an impermissible use for the Property under
the eminent domain statute, and that Mr. Fenley lacked standing to assert a claim for
eminent domain. R. 0068-0081.

1

Upon information and belief, Provo City has subsequently demolished the building in question.
The effect, if any, of that action on this case should be addressed at the trial court upon remand.
7

Mr. Fenley filed an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss on April 10, 2017. R.
0092-0160. As it pertains to this appeal, in that Opposition Mr. Fenley argued that:
Nash v. Clark ( 1904) is a great example of a taking initiated by a person
against their neighbor. No question of the right of an individual to exercise
eminent domain was even brought up. The only question before the court
in that matter was whether the intended taking could be considered a
"public use." In the end, even though the taking was used directly only by
the Plaintiff in that case, the use was deemed a public one because it
advanced agendas that the state had decided were priorities.

R.0095. Provo City then replied on April 17, 2017. R.0163-0167.
The trial court granted the Motion to Dismiss on April 18, 2017. R. 0168-0170
(Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss), attached as Addendum A. In that decision,
the trial court characterized Mr. Fenley's complaint as "seeking a declaration of his right
to eminent domain over property owned by Provo City," and then listed the requirements
for a declaratory judgment action. Id. R. 0169. The trial court went on to hold that
because Mr. Fenley "has not demonstrated that he has authority under the constitution,
statute, rule, regulation or case law to exercise eminent domain as an individual," he
therefore could not meet the requirement to show that there is a "justiciable controversy"
or that "he has a legally protectible interest in the controversy." Id. R. 0169. In finding
that Mr. Fenley lacked standing to pursue a declaratory judgment action, the trial court
held that "[w]ithout a legal right to bring a claim for eminent domain, Fenley has no
legally protectible interest in doing so." Id. R. 0169. It therefore dismissed the case with
prejudice. See Order of Dismissal, entered June 9, 2017, R. 0218-0220, attached as
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Addendum E; see also id. R. 0219 ("[Mr. Fenley] has failed to show authority under the
Constitution, statute, rule, regulation, or any case permitting the exercise of eminent
domain by an individual.").

Mr. Fenley also filed several post-judgment motions which are not relevant to this
appeal.

Mr. Fenley now appeals.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
1.

Mr. Fenley filed the Complaint in this action on March 7, 2017. R.

0001-0002.
2.

Provo City filed a Motion to Dismiss on April 3, 2017. R. 0068-0081.

3.

Mr. Fenley filed an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss on April 10, 2017. R.

0092-0160.
4.

Provo City replied on April 17, 2017. R.0163-0167.

5.

The trial court granted the Motion to Dismiss on April 18, 2017. R.

0168-0170.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court is in error because it ruled that as a matter of law, an individual may
not exercise the power of eminent domain under Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-6-501, et seq.
To the contrary, the applicable statutes specifically state that "a person" may "seek[] to
acquire property by eminent domain" if that person completes certain conditions

9

precedent and is using the property for an appropriate purpose. Utah Code Ann. §
78B-6-505(3). Thus, the trial court was in error and the order granting the Motion to
Dismiss should be reversed.
ARGUMENT

I.

APPLICABLE LAW.
On appeal, "[c]onclusions oflaw are accorded no particular deference and are

reviewed for correctness." Kendall Ins., Inc. v. R & R Group, Inc., 2008 UT App 235, 1
8, 189 P.3d 114. When interpreting a statute, "it is axiomatic that this court's primary
goal 'is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the purpose that the statute was
meant to achieve."' Monarrez v. Utah Dep 't of Transp., 2016 UT 10, 1 11, 368 P.3 d 846
(quoting Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 23, 1159, 345 P.3d 566). The "best evidence of the
legislature's intent is the plain language of the statute itself" and "[w]hen examining the
statutory language, we assume the legislature used each term advisedly and in accordance
with its ordinary meaning." State v. Miller, 2008 UT 61, 118, 193 P.3d 92 (citations and
quotations omitted, alteration in original). Of course, the Court does not interpret the
"plain meaning of a statutory term in isolation," but rather considers the "relevant context
of the statute," with the goal of interpreting the "provisions in harmony with other
statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Monarrez, 2016 UT at 1 11 ( citations
and quotations omitted).
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II.

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE EMINENT DOMAIN STATUTE
PERMITS PERSONS TO ACQUIRE PROPERTY THROUGH EMINENT
DOMAIN.

Nowhere in the eminent domain statute does it specifically list the types of
plaintiffs that may bring a claim thereunder. Instead, the code first lists out the
permissible uses of property sought to be obtained through the power of eminent domain.
See Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-6-501 (titled "Uses for which right may be exercised").
Then, the code lists the types of "estates and rights in lands" which may be taken. See id.
§ 78B-6-502. Then, it lists the types of private property which may be taken, including
but not limited to "lands belonging to the state, or to any county, city or incorporated
town, not appropriated to some public use." Id. § 78B-6-503(2). The statute then goes
on to list some conditions precedent to the filing of a lawsuit to acquire property through
eminent domain. Id. §§ 78B-6-504, 505.
In Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-6-505, the statute lists certain conditions precedent
applicable when a "political subdivision of the state" wishes to obtain property through
an eminent domain action. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-505(1 ). Two subsections later,
the statute lists different conditions precedent for when "[a) person, other than a political
subdivision of the state," wishes to obtain property through an eminent domain action.
Id. § 78B-6-505(3) (emphasis added).
The statute makes other references to a "person" being able to bring a claim for
eminent domain, as well. For example, in Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-6-507, which lists the

11

requirements for a complaint, the code states that "[t]he complaint shall contain ...
the name of the corporation, association, commission or person in charge of the public
use for which the property is sought, who must be styled plaintiffl.]" Utah Code Ann. §
78B-6-507(1)(a) (emphasis added). In the provision concerning inspection of property
subject to an eminent domain action, the code states that "[i]f land is required for public
use, the person ... in charge of the use may survey and locate the property," and also
permits that such a "person ... may, at reasonable times and upon reasonable notice,
enter upon the land and make examinations, surveys, and maps of the land." Id. §
78B-6-507(1), (2)(a). Later on, the code defines "condemnor" as "a person who acquires
property by purchase from a condemnee under threat of condemnation." Id. §
78B-6-520.3(1 )(d).
Although the term "person" is not defined in the eminent domain statute, it strains
credulity to think that the word would exclude an individual human being. Cf Kramer v.

State Retirement Bd., 2008 UT App 351, ~ 14, 195 P.3d 925 ("Thus, while the term
'person' is not defined in title 49, UAPA [Utah Administrative Procedures Act] defines
this term as 'an individual, group of individuals, partnership, corporation, association,
political subdivision or its units, governmental subdivision or its units, public or private
organization or entity of any character, or another agency."' (quoting Utah Code Ann. §
63G-4-103(1)(g))); see also Black's Law Dictionary at 1142-43 (Deluxe 6th ed. 1990)
(defining "Person" as: "In the general usage, a human being (i.e. natural person), though

12

by statute term may include labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations,
legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers."), attached hereto as
AddendumF.
The legislative intent of the above-cited references to a "person" having certain
rights and obligations in connection with an action to condemn property under the
eminent domain statute is clear: individuals may bring condemnation actions in their
personal capacity. As such, the trial court made an error of law holding that an individual
cannot bring an action under the eminent domain statute, and the ruling dismissing the
case with prejudice should be reversed.

III.

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS PERMITTED INDIVIDUALS TO
PURSUE CONDEMNATION ACTIONS IN THE PAST.
Nash v. Clark is an example of a Utah Supreme Court case in which an individual

was permitted to obtain, through the power of eminent domain, a property interest in
property owned by his neighbors, also private citizens. 7 5 P. 3 71 (Utah 1904), affirmed
on appeal in Clarkv. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905). In that case, "Plaintiff [Mr. E.J. Nash]

brought this action to condemn a right of way in a ditch owned by the defendants," who
were individuals Lee Clark, Robert Bennett, T.F. Carlisle, Lincoln Carlisle, and Richard
Carlisle. Id. 371-72. Mr. Nash brought the action, relying upon a section of the eminent
domain code existing at the time which stated:
When any person or corporation desires to convey water for irrigation, or for
any other beneficial purpose, and there is a canal or ditch already
constructed that can be enlarged to convey the required quantity of water,
then such person or corporation, or the owner or owners of the lands through
13

which a new canal or ditch would have to be constructed to convey the
quantity of water necessary shall have the right to enlarge said canal or ditch
already constructed by compensating the owner of the canal or ditch to be
enlarged for the damage, if any, caused by said enlargement ....
Id. at 372 (citing Section 1278 Rev. Stat. 1898). The appellants in that case contended

that since Mr. Nash would be using the canal only to water his own property, that it was
not an appropriate taking due the the purely private use. Id. at 373 ("Appellants contend
that the order of the district court overruling the demurrer was erroneous for the reason
that the complaint on its face shows that the use to be made of the property sought to be
condemned is strictly private, and in no sense a public use."). The Utah Supreme Court
rejected that argument, holding that irrigation of lands was a public use. Id. at 373-74.
In reaching this conclusion, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the "two lines of
authorities" concerning what constituted a public use. Id. at 373. As explained by the
Utah Supreme Court, the first line of authorities "holds that by public use is meant a use
by the public or its agencies--that is, the public must have the right to the actual use in
some way of the property appropriated[.]" Id. The second line "holds that it is a public
use within the meaning of the law when the taking is for a use that will promote the
public interest, and which use tends to develop the great natural resources of the
commonwealth." Id. The Supreme Court ultimately held that:
[T]he class of decisions last mentioned is more in harmony with
enlightened public policy and that the liberal interpretation given the term
"public use" which the Legislature has in effect, declared shall be followed
in this State is far more conducive to individual and public advancement
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than the restricted construction adopted and followed by the line of
decisions first referred to.
Id.

The issue of whether Mr. Nash, as an individual, could exercise the power of
eminent domain was not specifically addressed in the Nash decision; the question was
whether his use constituted a public use. It is telling that the exercise of eminent domain
by an individual was not even raised. Indeed, the statute in question used the term
"person" in reference to the parties who may bring an eminent domain action, just like
the language in today's statute.
Notwithstanding the fact that the use of eminent domain by an individual was not
specifically addressed, the Utah Supreme Court's decision to follow the second line of
cases referenced above is consistent with the position advocated here by Mr. Fenley, and
specifically: the eminent domain statute does not list or limit the ability to use that power
to a particular set of plaintiffs. Rather, courts are to examine the use to which a plaintiff
is intending for the property in dispute, and whether it is consistent with the liberal
understanding of the term "public use" in eminent domain proceedings. See Utah Dep 't

ofTransp. v. Coalt Inc., 2016 UT App 169, 117, 382 P.3d 602 ('"The phrase "public
use," as used in the eminent domain statute, has been given a liberal interpretation by this
court."' (quoting Town ofPerry v. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P.2d 343, 346 (Utah 1933))).
Admittedly, the public use in Nash, i.e., use of water, differs from the public use to
which Mr. Fenley would put the Property. However, Mr. Fenley was deprived of the
15

opportunity to present his case for public use to the trial court because the trial court
dismissed his complaint in error on the grounds that he, as an individual, may not
exercise the power of eminent domain. Accordingly, the Court should reverse the
decision of the trial court.

CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the trial court.
DATED this 24th day of August, 2017.
NONPROFIT LEGAL SERVICES OF UTAH

Isl Aaron C. Garrett
AARON C. GARRETT

Attorneys for Appellant John Fenley
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ADDENDUMA

FILED
APR 18 2017
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT

JOHN FENLEY,

41:kl Ul1STRIC1

:Sl"Altl. OF UTAH
U'ID~ilf. COUNTY

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff,

vs.
Case No. 170400320
~ROVOCITY,
Judge James Brady
Defendant.

This matter comes before the court on Provo City's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b) for failure to state a cause of action. Fenley opposes the motion to dismiss, believing his
complaint states a legally cognizable claim for private condemnation of Provo City owned real
property by Fenley so he can put it to a public use. Fenely alleges that eminent domain is an
appropriate solution. The Court disagrees with Fenley's claim. Provo City's motion to dismiss is
GRANTED for the reasons stated below.
Rule 12(b)(6) URCivP allows for the filing of a motion to determine if the plaintiffs
complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. In ruling on a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor. Mounteer v Utah

Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991); and, Russell v Standard Corp., 898 P.2d
262(Utah 1995). Also, a motion to dismiss is appropriate ... where it clearly appears that the
plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any set of facts they could
prove to support their claim." Baker v. Angus, 910 P2.d 427,430 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

Page -1-

0168

•

•
•

STANDING
John Fenley is an individual seeking a declaration of his right to eminent domain over
property owned by Provo City.

•

•

•

Standing to seek a declaratory judgment requires four elements: "(l) there must be
a justiciable controversy; (2) the interests of the parties must be adverse; (3) the
parties seeking relief must have a legally protectible interest in the controversy;
and (4) the issues between the parties must be ripe for judicial determination."
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). The basic elements of the traditional test for standing are actual or
potential injury, causation, and redressability. Brown v. Division of Water Rights
ofDep't ofNatural Res., 2010 UT 14, ,r,r 17-18, 228 P.3d 747. In the context of a
quiet title action, this means that standing is "limited to parties who could acquire
an interest in the property created by the court's judgment or decree." Holladay
Towne Ctr., LLC v. Brown Family Holdings, LLC, 2011 UT 9, ,r,r 43, 54,248 P.3d
452 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Kemp v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 2013 UT App 88, ,r 5, 301 P.3d 23, 24

In response to Provo City's motion, Fenely has a duty to demonstrate that he has standing to seek

•

a declaratory judgement. Fenley has failed to do so. He does not demonstrate that there is a
justiciable controversy, and that he has a legally protectible interest in the controversy.
Fenley claims his purpose is to put the property to a public use. However, he has not

•

demonstrated that he has authority under the constitution, statute, rule, regulation or case law to
exercise eminent domain as an individual. Based on the information provided by the parties the
Court finds Fenley lacks standing to bring this action. Without a legal right to bring a claim for

•

eminent domain, Fenley has no legally protectible interest in doing so. The Court finds Fenley
lacks standing and grants Provo City's order to dismiss this case.
April I 8, 2017

•
Page -2-
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ADDENDUMB

Utah Code

Effective 5/13/2014
788-6-505 Negotiation and disclosure required before filing an eminent domain action.
(1) A political subdivision of the state that seeks to acquire property by eminent domain or that
intends to use eminent domain to acquire property if the property cannot be acquired in a
voluntary transaction shall:
(a) before the governing body, as defined in Subsection 788-6-504(2)(a), of the political
subdivision takes a final vote to approve the filing of an eminent domain action, make a
reasonable effort to negotiate with the property owner for the purchase of the property; and
(b) except as provided in Subsection (4), as early in the negotiation process described in
Subsection (1)(a) as practicable, but no later than 14 days before the day on which a final
vote is taken to approve the filing of an eminent domain action:
(i) provide the property owner a complete printed copy of the materials provided on the
Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman website in accordance with Section 13-43-203
regarding the acquisition of property for a public purpose and a property owner's right to just
compensation; and
(ii) provide the property owner a written statement in substantially the following form:
"Although this letter is provided as part of an attempt to negotiate with you for the sale
of your property or an interest in your property without using the power of eminent domain,
[name of political subdivision] may use that power if it is not able to acquire the property
by negotiation. Because of that potential, the person negotiating on behalf of the entity is
required to provide the following disclosures to you.
1. You are entitled to receive just compensation for your property.
2. You are entitled to an opportunity to negotiate with [name of political subdivision]
over the amount of just compensation before any legal action will be filed.
a. You are entitled to an explanation of how the compensation offered for your
property was calculated.
b. If an appraiser is asked to value your property, you are entitled to accompany the
appraiser during an inspection of the property.
3. You are entitled to discuss this case with the attorneys at the Office of the Property
Rights Ombudsman. The office may be reached at [provide the current contact information
for the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman].
4. The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman is a neutral state office staffed
by attorneys experienced in eminent domain. Their purpose is to assist citizens in
understanding and protecting their property rights. You are entitled to ask questions and
request an explanation of your legal options.
5. If you have a dispute with [name of political subdivision] over the amount of
just compensation due to you, you are entitled to request free mediation or arbitration of
the dispute from the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman. As part of mediation or
arbitration, you are entitled to request a free independent valuation of the property.
6. Oral representations or promises made during the negotiation process are not
binding upon the entity seeking to acquire the property by eminent domain."
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (4), the entity involved in the acquisition of property may not
bring a legal action to acquire the property under this chapter until 30 days after the day on
which the disclosure and materials required in Subsection (1 )(b)(ii) are provided to the property
owner.
(3) A person, other than a political subdivision of the state, that seeks to acquire property by
eminent domain or that intends to use eminent domain to acquire property if the property
cannot be acquired in a voluntary transaction shall:
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(a) before filing an eminent domain action, make a reasonable effort to negotiate with the
property owner for the purchase of the property; and
(b) except as provided in Subsection (4), as early in the negotiation process described in
Subsection (3)(a) as practicable, but no later than 30 days before the day on which the
person files an eminent domain action:
(i) provide the property owner a complete printed copy of the materials provided on the
Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman website in accordance with Section 13-43-203
regarding the acquisition of property for a public purpose and a property owner's right to just
compensation; and
(ii) provide the property owner a written statement in substantially the following form:
"Although this letter is provided as part of an attempt to negotiate with you for the sale
of your property or an interest in your property without using the power of eminent domain,
[name of entity] may use that power if it is not able to acquire the property by negotiation.
Because of that potential, the person negotiating on behalf of the entity is required to
provide the following disclosures to you.
1. You are entitled to receive just compensation for your property.
2. You are entitled to an opportunity to negotiate with [name of entity] over the
amount of just compensation before any legal action will be filed.
a. You are entitled to an explanation of how the compensation offered for your
property was calculated.
b. If an appraiser is asked to value your property, you are entitled to accompany the
appraiser during an inspection of the property.
3. You are entitled to discuss this case with the attorneys at the Office of the Property
Rights Ombudsman. The office may be reached at [provide the current contact information
for the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman].
4. The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman is a neutral state office staffed
by attorneys experienced in eminent domain. Their purpose is to assist citizens in
understanding and protecting their property rights. You are entitled to ask questions and
request an explanation of your legal options.
5. If you have a dispute with [name of entity] over the amount of just compensation
due to you, you are entitled to request free mediation or arbitration of the dispute from
the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman. As part of mediation or arbitration, you are
entitled to request a free independent valuation of the property.
6. Oral representations or promises made during the negotiation process are not
binding upon the entity seeking to acquire the property by eminent domain."
(4) The court may, upon a showing of exigent circumstances and for good cause, shorten the 14day period described in Subsection (1)(b) or the 30-day period described in Subsection (2) or
(3)(b).
Amended by Chapter 59, 2014 General Session
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788-6-507 Complaint -- Contents.
(1) The complaint shall contain:
(a) the name of the corporation, association, commission or person in charge of the public use for
which the property is sought, who must be styled plaintiff;
(b) the names of all owners and claimants of the property, if known, or a statement that they are
unknown, who must be styled defendants;
(c) a statement of the right of the plaintiff;
(d) if a right of way is sought, its location, general route, beginning and ending, and be
accompanied by a map of the proposed right of way, as it is involved in the action or
proceeding;
(e) if any interest in land is sought for a right of way or associated facilities for a subject activity
as defined in Section 19-3-318:
(i) the permission of the governor with the concurrence of the Legislature authorizing:
(A) use of the site for the subject activity; and
(B) use of the proposed route for the subject activity; and
(ii) the proposed route as required by Subsection (1 )(d); and
(f) a description of each piece of land sought to be taken, and whether it includes the whole or
only part of an entire parcel or tract.
(2) All parcels lying in the county and required for the same public use may be included in the
same or separate proceedings, at the option of the plaintiff, but the court may consolidate or
separate them to suit the convenience of parties.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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27 Utah 158

E. J. NASH, Respondent,
v.
LEE L. CLARK, ROBERT N. BENNETT, T. F.
CARLISLE, LINCOLN CARLISLE and RICHARD
CARLISLE, Appellants
No. 1406
Supreme Court of Utah
January 23, 1904

Appeal from the Fourth District Court, Utah County.--Hon.
J.E. Booth, Judge.
Action to condemn a right of way in a ditch owned by the
defendants. From ajudgment in favor of the plaintiff, the
defendants appealed.
AFFIRMED.
J. W. N. Whitecotton, Esq., for appellants.
Messrs. Warner, Houtz, Prentiss & Warner for respondent.
McCARTY, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
BARTCH, J., concurs. BASKIN, C. J., dissents.
OPINION
McCARTY,J.
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[27 Utah 159] STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Plaintiff brought this action to condemn a right of way in a
ditch owned by the defendants. The provisions of the statute
upon which he bases his right of action, so far as material to
this case, are as follows: Rev. St. 1898, section 3588, in part
provides: "Subject to the provisions of this chapter the right
of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of the
following public uses: . . . (5) Reservoirs, dams,
water-gates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, aqueducts, and
pipes for supplying persons, mines, mills, smelters, or other
works for the reduction of ores, with water for domestic or
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other uses, or for irrigating purposes, or for draining and
reclaiming lands, or for floating logs and lumber on streams
not navigable. (6) Roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels,
ditches, flumes, pipes, and dumping places to facilitate the
milling, smelting, or other reduction of ores, or the working
of mines; outlets, natural or otherwise, for the deposit or
conduct of tailings, refuse, or water from mills, smelters or
other works for the reduction of ores, or from mines; mill
dams; ... also an occupancy in common by the owners or
possessors of different mines, mills, smelters, or other
places for the reduction of ores, of any place for the flow,
deposit, or conduct of tailings or refuse matter . . .. (I 0)
Canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts, and
pipes for supplying and storing water for the operation of
machinery for the purpose of generating and transmitting
electricity for power, light, or heat." Section 1277, Rev.
Stat. 1898, is as follows: "Any person or corporation shall
have the right of way across and upon public, private, and
corporate lands, or other right of way, for the construction,
maintenance, repair, and use of all necessary reservoirs,
dams, water-gates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, or other
means of securing, storing, and conveying water for
irrigation, or for any necessary public use, or for drainage,
upon payment of just compensation therefor,

(27 Utah 160) but such right of way shall in all cases be
exercised in a manner not to unnecessarily impair the
practical use of any other right of way, highway, or public
or private road, nor to unnecessarily injure any public or
private property. Such right may be acquired in the manner
provided by law for the taking of private property for public
use."
Section 1278 provides: "When any person or corporation
desires to convey water for irrigation, or for any other
beneficial purpose, and there is a canal or ditch already
constructed that can be enlarged to convey the required
quantity of water, then such person or corporation, or the
owner or owners of the lands through which a new canal or
ditch would have to be constructed to convey the quantity
of water necessary shall have the right to enlarge said canal
or ditch already constructed by compensating the owner of
the canal or ditch to be enlarged for the damage, if any,
caused by said enlargement: provided, that said
enlargement is to be done at any time from the first day of
October to the first day of March, or at any other time that
may be agreed upon with the owner of said canal or ditch."
The complaint herein in substance alleges that plaintiff is
the owner of 80 acres ofland situated in Utah county, this
State, which land, without irrigation, is arid, barren, and
unproductive, but with irrigation would produce in
abundance, hay, grain, and other agricultural crops; that Ft.

•
Canyon creek is a natural stream of water in Utah county,
flowing from the mountains north of plaintiffs land in a
southerly direction to and near plaintiffs land, that the
defendants own a tract of land contiguous to and adjoining
plaintiffs land on the north, and are also the owners of a
certain ditch leading from Ft. Canyon creek over and across
their land to a point within 100 feet of plaintiffs land,
which ditch is a mile and a quarter in length, 18 inches
wide, and 12 inches deep; that plaintiff owns water in Ft.
Canyon creek sufficient to irrigate his land above
mentioned; that there is no other convenient or practicable

[27 Utah 161) way in which to divert the waters of said
creek and convey the san1e onto plaintiffs land except by
and through the ditch of defendants; that, in order to irrigate
his land, it is necessary that plaintiff have a right of way
through defendants' ditch; that for plaintiff to enter upon
defendants' land to enlarge their ditch will not injure them;
that plaintiff requested of defendants that they allow him to
go onto their land and enlarge their ditch, and use it for
conducting his water to and on his land, and offered to
contribute his share of the expense of maintaining the ditch
and all damages; that the defendants refused to permit him
to do so.
Plaintiff asks that he be permitted to enlarge defendants'
ditch to the extent of widening it one foot more; that he
have a perpetual right of way through said ditch when so
widened, and constructed for the purpose of diverting and
carrying his water from Ft. Canyon creek to his land for
irrigation purposes; that the damages for such right of way
and use of the ditch by plaintiff be fixed and determined,
and that upon payment by the plaintiff of such damages he
have such ditch condemned to the extent of and to the use
and for the purposes above set forth, and that defendants be
enjoined from in any way or manner asserting any right
antagonistic
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to this right of plaintiff; that, if plaintiff is permitted by
decree of this court to enlarge and use the ditch as
aforesaid, his land can be made productive and the use of
the water to which plaintiff is entitled can and will be put to
a beneficial and public use in the irrigation of plaintiffs said
land, and for no other purpose. Defendants interposed a
general demurrer to plaintiffs complaint, alleging that the
complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action. The demurrer was overruled. The
defendants elected to stand upon their demurrer, and the
plaintiff introduced evidence in support of the allegations of
his complaint, and the court entered judgment and decree in
favor of plaintiff, condemning defendants' land as prayed
for in the
127 Utah 162) complaint; and for a reversal of this

judgment the defendants have appealed to this court.
McCARTY, J., after a statement of the foregoing facts,
delivered the opinion of the court.
Appellants contend that the order of the district court
overruling the demurrer was erroneous for the reason that
the complaint on its face shows that the use to be made of
the property sought to be condemned is strictly private, and
in no sense a public use. Both the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of this State provide that
"private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation." This provision is construed
to mean that private property can not be taken for strictly a
private use, which counsel for respondent concede to be the
true and proper construction. This brings us to the only
question presented by this appeal, to-wit: Was the
condemnation of appellants' land in this case in law and in
fact for a public use? There is no fixed rule of law by which
this question can be determined. In other words, what is a
public use can not always be determined by the application
of purely legal principles. This is evident from the fact that
there are two lines of authorities, neither of which attempt
to lay down any fixed rule as a guide to be followed in all
cases. One class of authorities, in a general way, holds that
by public use is meant a use by the public or its
agencies--that is, the public must have the right to the actual
use in some way of the property appropriated; whereas the
other line of decisions holds that it is a public use within the
meaning of the law when the taking is for a use that will
promote the public interest, and which use tends to develop
the great natural resources of the commonwealth. After a
careful examination of the leading cases on this subject, we
are of the opinion that the class of decisions last mentioned
is more in harmony with enlightened public policy and that
the liberal interpretation given the term "public

127 Utah 163) use" which the Legislature has in effect,
declared shall be followed in this State is far more
conducive to individual and public advancement than the
restricted construction adopted and followed by the line of
decisions first referred to.
The question of the manner of appropriation and use of
water for domestic, irrigation, mining and manufacturing
purposes is, and ever since the advent of the early pioneers
has been, the most important and vital of all industrial
questions with which the people within this arid region have
been confronted. Their requirements, and, we might add,
their absolute necessities, impelled the Legislatures and
courts at an early date in the history of the States and
Territories strictly arid in character to depart from and lay
aside as impracticable some legal doctrines and rules
relating to the control and use of water which had therefore
been adhered to and followed for ages, and to adopt and put
in operation a new system of acquiring title in and to the

streams which are within the arid belt, the use of which was
found to be indispensable in agricultural pursuits, in mining,
in the establishment of industries, and in the general
development of the arid States and Territories. By an
examination of the records of the early cases in this State
(then Territory) wherein the court declined to follow and be
governed by the common-law doctrine or riparian rights in
its entirety, the same arguments were advanced by those
claiming title to water under and by virtue of this doctrine
as arc advanced by appellants in this case, to-wit, that
fundamental rights were being interfered with, and the
property of one citizen was being taken and given to
another. We very much doubt whether either advocate or
layman, who has witnessed the magnificent results wrought
by the change, would now contend that the Constitution
was overridden, or any natural or legal right of the citizens
invaded and their property confiscated, when the
common-law doctrine of riparian rights was modified for
the purposes of irrigation and mining, and a system for
appropriating
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(27 Utah 164) and acquiring title to water adopted that
made it possible for populous and flourishing common
wealths to grow up where the country otherwise would have
remained a desert, uninhabited, with the possible exception
perhaps of an occasional cattle or sheep ranch. The question
of how to increase the water supply in the arid region has
steadily grown in magnitude and importance until it has
become national as well as local. Congress realizing the
great public necessity for an increased water supply, and
appreciating the great possibilities that may be
accomplished in this and other States and Territories within
the arid belt by conserving and storing the high and surplus
waters caused by the melting snows which in the spring
months come down from the mountains in torrents, and are
either wasted in the deserts or find their way into box
canyons, where
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they can never be made available for irrigation or other
useful purposes, by a provision in the enabling act (section
12) granted to this State 500,000 acres of public lands lying
within the State, with which to create a fund to be used for
the purpose of building reservoirs; and later on, by an act
known as the "Irrigation Bill," created a fund from the
public revenues, which is swelling into the millions of
dollars, for the purpose of aiding in this most important of
all enterprises of a public character in the arid west, and
upon the success of which its future growth and prosperity
largely depends. The large expenditure of public funds in
this direction is not to be made for the purpose of enabling
the States and Territories directly benefited thereby, in their
sovereign capacity, to engage in farming and other lines of
industry, which are dependent upon the water supply, but to
ultimately enable the citizens, as individuals, to provide

themselves with homes, and to furnish additional
opportunities for the further development of the great
natural resources with which the arid region abounds. These
questions, which are the most important with which the arid
States and Territories have had to deal, and the successive
steps that have been taken in
127 lltah 165) advancing our system of irrigation, are
referred to for the purpose of showing the interest that the
public have always had and must of necessity continue to
have in the question of irrigation. The natural physical
conditions of this State are such that in the great majority of
cases the only possible way the farmer can supply his land
with water is by conveying it by means of ditches across his
neighbor's lands which intervene between his own and the
source from which he obtains his supply. The question
before us not only involves the right of the farmer to invoke
the law of eminent domain, when necessary, to enable him
to convey water to his farm, but that of the miner,
manufacturer, and persons engaged in other industrial
pursuits to build canals, flumes, and lay pipe lines over
adjoining and intervening lands, when necessary for the
purpose of conveying water necessary for the successful
prosecution of their respective enterprises. The future
growth, prosperity, upbuilding, and industrial expansion of
the State not only depend upon the storing and holding back
the high and surplus waters so they can be used in times of
scarcity, but also in a careful and judicious husbandry of the
supply now available; and it is entirely within the province
of the Legislature to enact such laws respecting the
appropriation and distribution thereof as will tend to
prevent unnecessary loss and waste, so long as vested rights
are upheld and maintained. Experience has shown that, the
greater the amount of water flowing in a ditch of a given
size and grade, the less the percentage of seepage and
evaporation. Therefore, as a general rule, the owners of
canals and ditches, instead of being damaged by their
enlargement and the turning therein of an additional
quantity of water, as is proposed in this case, will at least in
times of scarcity during the hot summer months, and
especially during the periods of protracted drouths, which
have become so common of late years in this State, be
benefited thereby, besides receiving the market value of the
land condemned. In view of the physical and climatic
(27 Utah 166) conditions in this State, and in the light of
the history of the arid west, which shows the marvelous
results accomplished by irrigation, to hold that the use of
water for irrigation is not in any sense a public use, and
thereby place it within the power of a few individuals to
place insurmountable barriers in the way of the future
welfare and prosperity of the State would be giving to the
term "public use" altogether too strict and narrow an
interpretation, and one we do not think is contemplated by
the Constitution.

The foregoing conclusions are supported by abundant
authority. 10 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law (2 Ed.), 1064, and
cases cited. In the case of Dayton Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11
Nev. 394, the plaintiff sought to condemn a right of way
over certain lands to a mining claim owned by plaintiff, to
be used for the purpose oftransporting wood, lumber,
timbers, and other material to enable it to conduct and carry
on its business of mining. The claim was made in that case,
as it is in this that the statute under which the action was
brought was unconstitutional for the same reasons as are
urged in the case before us. Mr. Chief Justice Hawley,
speaking for the court says: "That mining is the paramount
interest of the State is not questioned. That anything which
tends directly to encourage mineral developments and
increase the mineral resources of the State is for the benefit
of the public, and is calculated to advance the general
welfare and prosperity of the people of this State, is a
self-evident proposition. Hence, it necessarily follows that,
if the position contended for by the petitioner is
correct--and I believe it is--then the act is constitutional,
and should be upheld. Although other and weaker reasons
have been more frequently assigned, it seems to me that this
is the true interpretation upon which courts have really
acted in sustaining the right of eminent domain in favor of
railroads and other objects, and in several of the decided
cases this reason is expressly given .... Now, it happens, or
at least is liable to happen, that individuals, by receiving the
title

constitutional. DeGraffenried v. Savage, 9 Colo. App. 131,
4 7 P. 902; Yunker v. Nichols, I Colo. 551; Schilling v.
Rominger, 4 Colo. 100. In the case of Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v.
Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 17 S.Ct. 56, 41 L.Ed. 369, the court,
in the course of the opinion, says: "On the other hand, in a
State like California, which confessedly embraces millions
of acres of arid lands, an act of the Legislature providing for
their irrigation might well be regarded as an act devoting
the water to a public use, and therefore as a valid exercise
of the legislative power.... To irrigate, and thus to bring
into possible cultivation, these large masses of otherwise
worthless lands, would seem to be a pub1ic purpose, and a
matter of public interest, not confined to the landowners,
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[27 Utah 168) or even to any one section of the State. The
fact that the use of the water is limited to the landowner is
not therefore, a fatal objection to this legislation. In
conclusion the court on this point further says: "We have no
doubt that the irrigation of really arid lands is a public
purpose, and the water thus used is put to a public use."
Ellinghouse v. Taylor, 19 Mont. 462, 48 P. 757. There are
many other well-considered cases which declare the same
general doctrine as those referred to, but we deem it
unnecessary to make further citations.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed; the costs of
this appeal to be taxed against the appellants.
BARTCH, J., concurs. BASKIN, C. J., dissents.

(27 Utah 167) to barren lands adjacent to the mines, mills,
or works, have it within their power, by unreasonably
refusing to part with their lands for a just and fair
compensation . . .. to greatly embarrass, if not entirely
defeat, the business of mining in such localities. In my
opinion, the mineral wealth of this State ought not to be left
undeveloped for any quantity ofland actually necessary to
enable the owner or owners of mines to conduct and carry
on the business of mining. Nature has
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denied to this State many of the advantages which other
States possess, but by way of compensation to the citizens
has placed at her doors the richest and most extensive silver
deposits ever yet discovered. The present prosperity of the
State is entirely due to the mining developments already
made, and the entire people of the State are directly
interested in having the future development unobstructed by
the obstinate action of any individual or individuals. In the
case of Oury v. Goodwin, 26 P. 376, practically the same
question was involved as is presented here, and the
Supreme Court of Arizona, in an elaborate and exhaustive
opinion, in which many cases are cited and reviewed, held
that the use of water for irrigation is a public use, and that
an act of the Arizona Legislature, providing for the
condemnation of lands for canal purposes, was
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ROBERT D. WEST (#4769)
J. BRIAN JONES (#11816)
GARY D. MILLWARD (# 12170)
PROVO CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
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Provo, Utah 84603
(801) 852-6140
gmi llward@provo.org

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOHN FENLEY,
Plaintiff,
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
vs.
Case No. 170400320
PROVO CITY,
Judge James Brady
Defendant.

----~-- ---~---

---~-----~
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The Court, having considered the arguments of the parties as submitted in Defendant
Provo City's Motion to Dismiss, and for good cause appearing, the Court now makes the
following:
Findings of Fact:
Plaintiff John Fenley is an individual who seeks to exercise eminent domain over
property owned by Defendant Provo City, purportedly for a public use.
Conclusions of Law:
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure l 2(b )(6) allows for the filing of a motion to determine if the
plaintiffs complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. In
ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must construe the
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complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences
in his favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991); Russel v.
Standard Co,p., 898 P.2d 262 (Utah 1995). Also, "[a] motion to dismiss is appropriate ..

. where it clearly appears that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under the facts
alleged or under any set of facts they could prove to support their claim." Baker v.
Angus, 910 P.2d 427,430 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

Fenley's Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment, but fails to meet the elements required.
"Standing to seek a declaratory judgment requires four elements: "(I) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (2) the interests of the parties must be adverse; (3) the parties
seeking relief must have a legally protectible interest in the controversy; and (4) the
issues between the parties must be ripe for judicial determination." Kemp v. Wells Fargo
Bank, NA, 2013 UT App 88, ~ 5,301 P.3d 23. Fenley has failed to meet this standard.

He has not demonstrated a justiciable controversy or a legally protectable interest in the
controversy. He has failed to show authority under the Constitution, statute, rule,
regulation, or any case permitting the exercise of eminent domain by an individual.
Accordingly, Fenley lacks standing to bring this suit.
Order

Based on the foregoing, this case is ordered dismissed with prejudice.

Approved as to form:
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John Fenley [Refused: objection on file]
- - - - End of document (the date and Court's signature appear at the top of the first page) - - - -
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PER SALTUM
beysh(iy)ow est/. It is in the nature of things that he
who denies a fact is not bound to give proof.

Per saltum / p~r s6lt~m/. Lat. By a leap or bound; by a
sudden movement; passing over certain proceedings.
Per sam ple /p~r sa:mp~I/. By sample. A purchase so
made is a collateral engagement that the goods shall be
of a particular quality. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(c).

Per sc / piir siy/'sey/. Lat. By itself; in itself; taken
alone; by means of itself; through itself; inherently; in
isolation; unconnected with other mut ters; simply as
such; in its own nature without reference to its relation.
In law of defamation, certain words and phrases that
are actionable as slander or libel in and of themselves
without proof of special damages, e.g. accusation of
crime. Used in contrast to defamation per quod which
requires proof of special damage. See Actionable per se;
Libelous per se; Slanderous per se.
See also Negligence per se: Per se doctrine; Per se
violations.
Pcr sccu tio /piirs~kyuwsh(iy)ow/. Lat. [n the civil law,
a following after; a pursuing at law; a suit or prosecuLion. Properly that kind of judicial proceeding before
the prretor which was called "extraordinary." In a
general sense, any judicial proceeding, including not
only "actions" (actiones), properly so called, but other
proceedings also.
Per s e doctr in e. Under the "per se doctrine." if an
activity is blalant in its intent and pernicious in its
effect, a court need not inquire into the reasonableness
of the snme before determining that it is a violation of
the antitrust laws. Connecticut Ass'n of Clinical Laboratories v. Connecticut Blue Cross, Inc., 31 Conn.Sup. 10,
324 A.2d 288, 291. See Per se violations.

Persequl / p~rs~kw::iy/. Lat. In the civi l law, to follow
after; to pursue or claim in form of law. An action is
called a "}us pcrsequendi."
Per se violations. In anti-trust law, term that implies
that certain types of business agreements, such as pricefixing, are considered inherently anti-competitive and
injurious to the public without nny need to determine if
the agreement has actually injured market competition.
See Per se doctrine; Rule (Rule of reason).
Perl!on. In general usage, a human being (i.e. natural
person), though by statute term may include labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal
representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers. See e.g. National Labor Relations Act. § 2(1),
29 U.S.C.A. § 152; Uniform Partnership Act, § 2.
Scope and delineation of term is necessary for determining those to whom Fourteenth Amendment of Constitution affords protection since this Amendment expressly applies Lo "person."
AlieM. Aliens are "persons" within meaning of Fourteenth Amendment a nd a re thus protecte<l by equal
protection clause against discriminatory state action.
Foley v. Connelie, D.C.N.Y.. 419 F.Supp. 889, 891.

Bankruptcy Code. "Person" includes inclivi.duifi.::(
ncrship, and corporation, but not govcrnniiintar ·
11 U.S.CA. § 101.
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Commercial law. An iodividunl,t)r org~nizatioh. .
§ 1-201(30).
_,
Corporation. A corporation is a "person" within'·&
ing of Fourteenth Amendment equal protectiori'~ild;
process provisions of United States Constitution:'M
politan Life Ins. Co. V. Ward, Ala., 470
S.Ct. 1676, 1683, 84 L.Ed.2d 751. The ter m "persii
statute relating to conspiracy to commit offe·n·s'e°:~-'
United States, or to defraud United States, or'any
cy, includes corporation. Alamo Fence Co. of I-iou~
U.S., C.A.Tex., 240 F.2d 179, 181.
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In corporate law, "person" includes individ ·
entity. Rev.Model Bus.Corp.Act. § 1.40. . ';,,
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Foreign government. Foreign govern~~n~·:.:·6 t1W
eligible to sue in U.S. courts are "persons!'. ciititf
bring treble-damage suit for alleged antitrust' viola
under Clayton Act, Section '1. Pfizer, Inc;_ ';;;;. al
mcnt of India. C.A.Minn., 550 F.2d 39~.· .
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Illegitimate child. Illegitimate children · are' "pe --•
within meaning of the Equal Protection Clii'ifsel'
Fourteenth Amendment, Levy v. Louisiana, 391
88 S.Ct. 1509, 1511, 20 L.Ed.2d 436; and scope of'·.,
ful death statute, Jordan v. Delta Drilling eo·., ·wyP.2d 39, 48.
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l11teresled person. Includes heirs, devisees; ch·
spouses, creditors, beneficiaries and any otherii ha~i'
property right. in or claim against a trust
estate of a decedent, ward or protected perl50n''lr
may be a ffected by the proceeding. It ais'o,
persons having priority for a ppointment· ii'ii''p~·
representative, and other fiduciaries represe'i'itfng
ested persons. The meaning as it relates t.o''· ,..,
persons may vary from time to time and must ~
mined according to t he particular purposes
ter involved in, any proceeding. Uniform Proba ..
§ 1- 201(20).
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Labor unions. Labor unions are "persons" und
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, Case/
C.A.Wash., 578 F.2d 793, 797, and a lso under k:·
cy Code, Highway and City Freight Driver.;'. 't>~
and Helpers, Local Union No. 600 v. Gordon Tia'
Inc., C.A.Mo., 576 F.2d 1285, 1287.
.
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Minors. Minors are "persons" under the Urifi.e
Constitution, posses..sed of rights that govc·r nftic'r,
respect. In re Scott K., 24 C.3d 395, 155 Cal.Rp
674, 595 P.2cl 105.
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Municipalities. Municipalities and othet
units are ·•persons" within meaning of 42\ ,
§ 1983. Local government officials sued in the_i_~..,
capacities arn "persons" for purposes of Sectio#
those cases in which a local government would b .
in its own name. Monell V . N. Y. City De]ia,,
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018;,.
L.Ed.2d 611. See Color of law.
.. ··-·

PERSONAL EFFECTS
·n of "person" or " persons" covered by anti\ncludes cities, whet.her as municipal utility
·u~ as plaintiffs seeking damages for antitions or as operators being sued as defendants.
,iycU.e, La. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
. .S. 389, 98 S.Ct. 1123, 1128, 55 L.Ed.2d 364.
One for whom a conservator has been
~r other pr9tective order has been made.
Probate Code,.§ 5-103(18).
i alie,;, A resident. alien is a "person" within
' ing of the due process and equal protection
of the Fourteenth Amendment. C. D. R. Entcriui:-'v·.·Board of Ed. of City of New York, D.C.
i2 i,.supp. 1164, 1168.
~, child. Word "person" as used in the Four;.r{i~ndmenl does not include the unborn. Roe v.
410 ·u.s. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 729, 35 L.Ed.2d 147.
1
·"'' child is a "person" for purpose of remedies
for personal injuries, and ch ild may sue after his
·Weaks v. Mounter, 88 Nev. 118, 493 P.2d 1307,
In some jurisdictions a viable fetus is considered
n within the meaning of the state's wrongful
statute, e.g. Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144
67, 698 P.2d 712, and within the meaning of the
vehicular homicide stat.ut.e, e.g. Comm. v. Cass,
. . 799, 467 N.E.2<l 1324. See also Child; Children
~ts of unbom child}, Unborn child; Viable child.
rsity. A state university is a "person", within
ing of § 1983. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Uberoi v.
. ·ven;ity of Colorado, Colo., 713 P.2d 894, 900.
/~rsown~/ ·. Lat. ln the civil law, character in
·.·u.e of _.which certain rights belong to a man and
--~,, quties arc imposed upon him. Thus one man
. ... _u nite many characters (perso11.£), as, fo r example,
(~acters of father and son, of muster and servant.
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it~11ble /p~rsan~bal/. Having the rights and powers
person; able to hold or maintain a pica in court;
·. ~p~city to take anything grant.ed or given.
rt;'-o' '.~a conjuncta requipnr atur interesse proprio
~rs6.wna kanj:iokta ekwap.!re~r int~resiy prow,_rJy{Jw/. A personal connection [literally, a united pern, ;1!,IUon with a person] is equivalent t.o one's own
~r_est; nearness of blood is as good a consideration as
es_own interest.
g~~ designate. / parsowna dezagneyt.;i/. A person
_inted out or described as an individual, as opposed to
_:person ascertained as a member of a class, or as fill ing
·ll~it.i~ular character.
ecclesire /pdrsown~ ,kliyziyiy/. The parson or
.:}.J~.1.!~tion of the church.
..~r~_~ na est homo c um statu quodam consider a tus
/ p~rs6wnd est h owmow k~m st,ctyuw kwowdam
,,k,nsid~re~s/ . A person is a man considered with
:ief!)rence to a cer_tnin status.
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.. ,e~<?.n aggrieved. To have standing as a "person ag,_,;· e_ved" under equal employment opportunities provi· 819µs of Civil Rights Act, or to assert rights under any
'.Jederal regulatory statute, a plaintiff must show (1) that
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he has actually suffered an injury, and (2) that the
interest sought to be protected by the complainant is
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute in question. Foust v. Transamerica Corp., D.C.Cal., 391 F.Supp. 312, 314 .
As contemplated by federal rule governing standing to
object to alleged illegal search and seizure is one who is
the victim of the search and seizure, as distinguished
from one who claims prejudice only through the use of
evidence gathered in a search directed at someone else.
Cochron v. U.S., C.A.Colo., 389 F.2d 326, 327.

Test of whether a petitioner is a "person aggrieved"
and thereby entitled t.o seek review of an order of
referee in bankruptcy is whet.her his property may be
diminished, his burden increased or his rights detrimentally affected by order sought to be reviewed. In re
Capit.ano, D.C.La., 315 F.Supp. 105, 107, 108.

See also Aggrieved party; Standing to sue doctrine.
Personal. Appertaining lo the person; belonging to an
individual; limited to the person; hav;ng the nature or
partaking of the qualities of human beings, or of mova•
ble property. ln re Sieimes' Estate, 150 Misc. 279, 270
N.Y.S. 339.
As to personal Action; Assets; Chattel; Contract; Covenant; Credit; Demand; Disability; Franchise; Injury;
Judgment; Knowledge; Liberty; Notice; Obligation; Property; Replevin; Representative; Right; Security; Service;
Servitude; Statute; Tax; Tithes; Tort; and Warranty, sec
those t itles.
P e rsonal belongings. In probate law, term is u broad
classification and in absence of restriction may include
most or all of the testator's personal property. Goggans
v. Simmons, Tex.Civ.App., 319 S.W.2d 442,445. See also
Personal effects.
Personal d efenses. In commercial law, term usually
refers t-0 defenses t hat cannot be asserted against a
holder in due course in enforcing un instr ument. Also
refers to defenses of a principal debtor against o creditor
that cannot be asserted derivatively by a surety.
Personal effects. Articles associated with person, as
property having more or less intimate relation to person
of possessor; "effects" meaning movable or chat.tel property of any kind. Usual reference is to such items as
the following owned by a decedent at the time of death:
clothing, furniture, jewelry, stamp and coin collections,
silverware, china, crystal, cooking utensils, books, cars,
televisions, radios, et.c.
Term "personal effects" when employed in a will
enjoys no settled technical meaning and, when used in
its primary sense, without any qualifying words, ordinarily embrnces s uch tangible property as is worn or
carried about the person, or tangible property having
some intimate relation to the person of the testator or
testatrix; where it is required by the context within
which tho term appears, it may enjoy a broader meaning. In re Stengel's Estate, Mo.App., 557 S.W.2d 255,
260.

